Introduction
Over the past few decades, the liberalization in international trade has progressed at rapid speed. Many traditional forms of barriers to trade, most importantly tariffs and quotas, have been reduced worldwide. Accompanying this great reduction in trade barriers has also been a great expansion in trade. Trade to GDP ratio has increased 86.1 percent from 1950 to 1990, and a large proportion is likely to be accounted by the reduction in trade barriers. (Bergoeing and Kehoe 2003) . While tariffs and quotas have been and continue to be reduced, another type of trade barrier, antidumping, is being used more and more frequently as a measure of protection. (Prusa and Skeath, 2002) . Further complicating the role of antidumping is the fact that the economies who are being affected by antidumping protection has changed over time; traditionally antidumping was used by and against developed economies, but over the past decade developing economies have emerged as frequent targets (and users) of antidumping (Prusa, 2001; Fu, 1997) .
In this paper, we focus on the case of China, to explore the characteristics, the reasons for and implications of antidumping. China initiated trade liberalization about 25 years ago, and since has observed an accelerated increase in exports. Coincidental with its increased exports, China has also become the largest targeting economy of antidumping (AD) trade disputes. There are many aspects of AD that explain why China is more susceptible to antidumping, including its non-market economy (NME) status. Yet, as suggested by Blonigen (2003) , even after controlling for all these unfavorable factors, China is subject to an inexplicably large number of antidumping attacks.
The literature on antidumping against China includes several articles that review the use of AD by EU (Vermulst and Graafsma, 1992; Liu and Vandenbussche, 2002; Mai, 2002; Eeckhout, 1997; Wang, 1999) , and two that examine the US AD cases (McGee, 1999; Kao, 1990) . A recent working paper by Messerlin (2002) also discusses the characteristics of AD activity against China.
Our paper builds on the previous studies, and make new contributions in analyzing the reasons for China being so broadly and intensively targeted. In particular, the domestic characteristics of exports structure and industrial structures are examined. Our analysis also reveals that foreign direct investment (FDI) may be a significant factor explaining AD cases against China. There is also evidence that low concentration ratios in Chinese industries have contributed to the competitive price and low profit margins.
The next section discusses the characteristics of AD cases targeting Chinese imports. We then analyze the reasons for AD activity against China and discuss some implications for the Chinese economy. We make a few concluding comments in the final section.
2.
Characteristics of AD Cases Against China
We would like to establish a set of stylized facts about AD targeting China, focusing on the size, trend, intensity, and broadness.
A. The size and the trend
As it is well known, China is the largest target economy for AD cases. The total number of AD cases targeting China reached 457 by the end of 2001, making China's total only slightly lower that all of the EU economies combined. If current trends continue, China will surpass the EU in the near future. China is easily the largest target when compared with any individual economy.
In Table 1 , we present the time series since 1980 of the top six economies affected by AD investigations. The US was the top target economy during the early 1980s; it was then replaced by Japan who remained the most targeted economy during the rest of the 1980s.
Since 1992, China has been the top targeted economy every year. Not only is it the largest affected economy, but also the number of cases against China easily surpasses the level of the US and Japan when they were the leading targets. Overall even though China only become a significant target in the past ten years, its total number of AD cases has surpassed the US and Japan, and China has emerged as the largest targeted economy.
Not only is the number of AD cases targeting China high, but also the trend is positive and increasing at a rapid rate. The number of cases against China was relatively small in the early to mid 1980s; since 1988, however, there has been a marked increase in the number of cases against China by both the EU and the US (Vermulst and Graafsma, 1992) .
In order to quantify this trend in AD filings we have applied a simple fixed effect OLS model:
where n it = number of cases filed against economy i at time t (e.g., each year)
In table 2 we report our estimates. Note that our regression includes an time dummy for each economy; however, for space reasons we only report the parameters for the nine economies with statistically significant estimates. As shown it turns out, the time trend for most economies is insignificant; in addition, most economies with significant estimates have negative trends. There are only four economies showing positive trends:
China, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. The time trend for China is the steepest of all target economies. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the other three economies with a positive coefficient have much milder slope in comparison with China. Moreover, as we will discuss later (Table 6 ) it is developing economies such as India and Mexico that are main contributors to the steep upward trend. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, China is likely to stay as the most named economy in AD filings and is going to see continuing increase in the share of total AD filings.
B. The intensity
Because of China's growing international trade and growing size of the economy, it is perhaps not surprising to see it being named frequently in AD filings. After all, more trade may simply lead to more filings against it. The next question to ask, then, is whether China is also being named more intensively than other economies given its trade value. The answer is positive.
The intensity of AD against China is high. As we have already shown China is the leading AD target. In terms of international trade, China ranks as the sixth largest in the world both in terms of exports and imports. This disparity suggests the intensity of AD use against China is high. To quantify this point we compute three indicators for intensity of being targeted for AD (see Table 3 ). The first is the "AD-export" ratio, which is defined as an economy's share of AD cases in the world divided by its share in world exports. If an economy's AD-export ratio is above 1, it means that the economy is being targeted more than its share in exports.
Consider China's intensity number. China accounts for about 4.3 percent of total world exports in 2001, and an astounding 17 percent of all AD cases (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) Our third intensity measure combines the first two in order to indicate the overall possibility of an economy's exports being subject to AD duties. This third measure is reported in the final column where we calculate the product of the first two measures.
With this third measure, China ranks 3 rd , trailing Ukraine and India. However, one needs to remember that the total number of cases against India and Ukraine combined is only 40 percent of the total against China. In this sense, China exports bear the most significant brunt of AD protection.
One important caveat: one must recognize that all of the above three measures offer only crude estimates of AD intensity. There are a number of weaknesses in these measures, not the least is that none of them accurately measure the amount of trade being affected in any given case.
C. The AD measures
The duties resulting from the final determination can be very high in AD cases against China. In many cases, the measures are prohibitive. For instance, Liu and Vandenbussche (2002) and Fu (1997) 
D. The sectors being named
We also investigate the type of Chinese products that are targeted by AD investigations.
Our results indicate that the range of industries that have been the targets for AD is amazingly wide. In terms of two-digit ISIC classification of industries, all 2-digit manufacturing industries have been targeted (Table 4) cases, and 37 sectors named from once to six times (Table 5 ).
E. The filing economies
The next issue we examine is the question of who is targeting Chinese exports. We find that China has been targeted by a wide array of economies. Treating all EU members as one economy, there have been 25 economies that have launched AD investigation against Chinese exports.
Among the top initiators are: US, EU, India, Australia, Argentina, and Mexico; together they account for 72 percent of all AD cases filing against China. AD activity, therefore, is concentrated among a handful of major users. In order to examine whether there are significant differences in the filing intensity we computed each economy's filing intensity and relative filing intensity as:
Intensity i = Number of filings against China i / Imports from China i Relative Intensity i = Intensity i / Intensity US
As shown in 3.
The Reasons for High China's AD Intensity and High AD Duties
In this section, we investigate the reasons for the large number and high intensity of AD investigations targeting China, as well as the high AD duties in AD cases against China.
First we document the likely contributing factors that are shared with other economies, such as the strategic use of AD, NME status, the role of cumulation, and inexperienced and ineffective legal defenses. We then focus on a couple of factors that are very unique in China, the roles played foreign direct investment (FDI) through foreign invested enterprises (FEI) and the low concentration ratio in many Chinese industries.
A. AD as a learned strategy for domestic firms blocking foreign competition
To what extent is AD a learned strategic behavior? How can we account the proliferation of AD across industries and across economies? Prusa and Skeath (2002) and Fu (1997) argue that it is likely that firms learn that AD can be used strategically to block foreign competition. In the case of China, because of its rapid increase in trade, the publicity about China is abundant. Publicity about China lowers the cost of acquiring information needed in the AD petition. We have examined the possibility of copying from the same industries across economies in launching AD investigations as an indication of an informational spillover. A simple measure is to check how many antidumping cases for the similar products occur within one year of one other in different economies (e.g., similar case against Chinese exports by both EU and US within one year). If a case is launched shortly after a similar case by another economy, we will say the second "echoes" the initial filing.
We find that there have been 83 cases against China that could be said to echo. That is, these cases were initiated within one year of another economy initiating an AD case involving the same or very similar products. Cases involving textiles and footwear frequently echoed. For example, in the case of textiles, EU, Mexico, Turkey and Peru each launched AD investigations on a wide array of textile products within a short time frame.
We believe our measure is conservative in two senses. First, we restrict our measure to only one year, however, a span of 18 month or longer could be reasonably called an echoing period. Moreover, the learning could occur across wide array of products (echoing within an economy rather than between economies). For example, Mexico had AD investigations covering HS codes 52, 53, 54 and 55, and Peru had investigations covering "various fabrics". Simply put, it seems likely that the learning occur across industries, which is a type of learning that our measure does not capture.
Can AD initiation be a learned tactic for declining industries? This seems to be a very logical tactic for some industries. It is fairly commonly observed that AD investigations involved the same (or similar) line of products are filed repeatedly over time. Steel is perhaps the best example where both the US and EU have filed AD investigations involving many types of Chinese steel over the past decade. Australia launched investigation on canned pear and peaches, and soon thereafter started investigation on canned tomatoes. In EU, the AD investigation against Chinese made cotton fabrics was initiated three times in 1994, 1996 and 1997.
Therefore, it seems that AD protection can be contagious across economies and becomes a learned behavior over time. If an AD action against foreign competitor can achieve an affirmative result with a high probability, or if it deters the imports through litigation costs, then AD is more likely to become a learned behavior. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case. According to various studies Skeath 2002, Fu 1997) , AD investigations have successfully deterred imports and raised profitability of initiating firms, therefore, the economic rational for troubled firms to initiate AD is very strong.
B. Non-market economy (NME) status
There are a few widely recognized reasons that Chinese exports receive disproportional amount of AD investigations. China's non-market economy status is arguably the most commonly cited explanation.
The GATT/WTO antidumping rules allow an investigating economy to not use the exporter's domestic prices when calculating the home market sales, input costs, etc.
Being classified as a non-market makes it extremely difficult (virtually impossible) for exporting economy to defend itself. China has always been classified as a non-market economy. In the accession protocol to WTO, China agreed that this non-market treatment would not be phased out for another 15 years (will expire in 2016).
The argument is that China is not considered a market economy; thus Chinese domestic prices do not reflect the true cost of these inputs as determined in the markets. Therefore, during the investigation of antidumping case targeting China, the investigators do not have to use the Chinese domestic input prices in determining the cost of the production of the investigated product.
This practice renders greatly increases China's risk in dumping allegations because the low cost of labor services is its major comparative advantage for international trade. In practice, China's non-market economy status hands greater discretionary power to the investigators, who have the option to choose an economy with high prices when evaluating the cost of inputs in China. For example, in a recent investigation in brake rotors by the US, the handling and freight cost was calculated using India cost. India is known for higher cost of transportation than most of its neighbors. 1 Therefore, using India price would increase the likelihood of affirmative result.
Even though non-market status contributed to unfavorable determination in AD investigations against China, it is probably not sufficient to explain the large number of cases targeting China (Blonigen, 2003 
C. Cumulation
Cumulation is another factor that increases the number of cases against China. As is well known, China has experienced a rapid expansion of the international trade. that the China's import market share in a particular economy will rise rapidly from nonexistent or very small to above the low threshold for cumulation. Therefore, even though
Chinese imports in many products still capture only a small proportion of the market, with the cumulative assessment of the market share, China is included in the investigation even though China is not (at the time of the filing of the case) a significant exporter to foreign markets. Hansen and Prusa (1996) It remains to see whether filing complaints has any impact on the cases initiated or not. If it does, as common sense would predict, then the fact that China does not use the DSB might lead the initiating economy over-reach in its efforts to levy ADD on cases against
China. This issue is not a factor controlled in Blonigen's (2003) study that found a significant positive "China effect" in AD activity. Future research should examine whether WTO DSB has any deterrent effect on AD activity.
E. Foreign direct investment and the "antidumping (AD) triangle"
Once China relaxed the regulations governing FDI in 1992 inward FDI has increased dramatically. Currently the foreign invested enterprises (FIE), the firms with FDI, account for roughly 50 percent of both Chinese imports and exports.
Blonigen (2000) Table 8 , FDI is the only significant explanatory variable, and it is significant at the 99 percent level. Exports are statistically insignificant and the exchange rate has wrong sign. 4 As shown in Figure 3 , the high correlation between FDI and AD filings is obvious. This simple regression lends strong support for the notion that Chinese FDI inflow plays an important role in the number of AD cases filed. This is also consistent with the proposed special type of tariff jumping, the "AD triangle".
F. Low concentration ratio in Chinese industries
One particular feature of Chinese industries is their very low concentration ratios.
Existing studies focus on the geographic concentration, which is high (Amiti and Wen 2002) . However the market concentration is very low. Even though no much literature has been found on this, low concentration is a well-recognized fact, and in the Tenth Five-year Plan on Industrial Structure Adjustment, the fact that production concentration is low was recognized as one of the major problems of current industrial structure in China. According to the analysis in the Third Industrial Census (National Statistic Bureau 2003), one of the major problem is "small and scattered scale of industrial organization".
A brief comparison can demonstrate the huge difference in concentration level in industries between China and the US. In the US, 50 largest industrial firms count for 23% of total production in manufacturing (in year 1997), and top 201 firms count for 60% of total 5 . Whereas in china, 375 largest firms produce 16% of total industrial output in 2001, and it takes an enormous number of 22,987 firms to produce 60% of total industrial output 6 . The difference is huge. Even though the US data is for manufacturing only and
China data is for all industries including manufacturing, utility and mining sectors, it does not affect the result much. In the US, mining counts only 4% and utility counts for 9% of 5 Data source: 1997 Economic Census, US Census Bureau. 6 Data source: industrial output, thus it can only affect slightly the overall US concentration level presented above 7 . Therefore, the statistics strongly indicates that Chinese industries are far less concentrated than that of the US.
Given very low production and market concentration, profitability of Chinese firms is reduced. The low profit margins, when facing AD investigation, which typically specify high profit margin when evaluating cost of production, can lead to higher imposed duties.
This is still only a hypothesis and need further investigation whether its impact is significant enough leading to quantitative impacts on AD determinations. The low profit margin in Chinese firms can also lead to undercutting the exports prices, which will lead to more AD initiations.
The mirror problem of the low concentration and low profit margin in Chinese industries is the relatively high concentration ratio and higher profitability in many major AD initiating economies. In the highly concentrated industries, the firms exhibit more strategic behavior, and are more likely to utilize the tool of AD regulation to block the foreign competition. This has been confirmed by the study on EU AD (Liu and Vandenbussche, 2002) who document that the majority of AD files are filed by highly concentrated industries; in many cases monopolists and oligopolies in the EU market; a very small proportion (less than 15 percent) involve not so concentrated industries. This statistic also applies to the US, another major user of AD, where the industrial 7 In fact, the utility sector in the US is also very concentrated, with 4 largest firms counting 15% of total revenue of the sector. The mining sector is less concentrated, but with its 4% share of total output, it will produce only negligible impact on overall concentration level. Data source: 1997 Economic Census, US Census Bureau.
concentration among industries using AD is high (Hansen and Prusa, 1996) . In many respects, this finding illustrates one of the great ironies of AD regulation ---instead of creating "fair" competition, it punishes the competitive international industries, and encourage uncompetitive domestic behavior.
Implications
It is a difficult task to evaluate the impacts of AD on China. One reason is the lack of data, but another is that the dynamic impacts are yet to be fully understood. For instance, the US uses individual treatment, which often gives one (or a few Chinese exporters) smaller ADD and all other Chinese exporters, current or future, a very high ADD. In this case it not only alters the trade pattern, it also will affect the industrial structure in China.
However, these effects are hard to use a formal treatment to estimate, therefore in this section we only discuss qualitatively some likely impacts of the large, growing, intensive, severe, and broad AD filings against Chinese exports.
The amount of Chinese exports affected by AD, among trade remedies, is the second largest, only trailing technical barriers. According to Yue (2003) , the cumulated amount of exports that have been affected has reached 16 billion US dollars. Fu (1997) estimates that about 5 percent of Chinese exports to EU are affected by EU AD filings. This number is very large considering the strong deterring effect of AD investigation on imports. In comparison with tariffs, ADD are very high and target the particular products.
As we have discussed in the intensity of AD from various economies, EU is modest in terms of intensity of filing, therefore, it is very likely in other economies, the trade affected will be much higher than 5 percent of total. Therefore, the amount of trade affected is very significant. The cost is also to employment, which will be adversely affected through the decrease in exports, which will further complicate China's continuing economic transition.
Moreover, learning from the lessons of antidumping, some Chinese manufactures have begun to form alliance, restricting the price of exports to the US. For example, the apple cider producers in China now meet annually to determine the minimum price to the US. It is natural to see more and more firms become aware and begin to charge higher export prices toward major users of AD. This might contribute toward increasing the concentration ratio in Chinese industries, or even create monopolies or oligopolies in exports markets.
Moreover, according to our finding on the role of FDI in explaining the AD filings, the multinationals or foreign investors are likely hurt by AD filings against Chinese exports.
Will China become a new important user of AD? We think yes. The number of cases filed by China is increasing rapidly. We have illustrated in Figure 4 the number of cases initiated by China, which has a clear positive trend. There is no evidence China has used AD as a retaliation toward economies filing AD against Chinese exports, however, it should be recognized that China has it own industries to protect, and it might find that AD can be a very convenient instrument for protection. The ongoing pressure of unemployment, and the fact that much needed expansion of Chinese exports sector employment is constrained by the foreign AD filings, it is natural for China to use the same tool to retain employment. If this occurs, AD will lead to mutual welfare worsening effects.
Conclusion
We have examined the case of AD filings for Chinese exports, the largest in the world, in this paper, and document the characteristics of these AD filings. We have shown that AD activity against China has involved and continues to involve a large number of filings;
that AD use against China is increasing; that intensity of AD use against China is high; that Chinese cases often involve very high duty levels; that AD cases against China have broad industrial coverage, and have been initiated by many economies. We then analyze the possible causes and/or contributing factors for the use of AD against China. Besides common factors being recognized by other studies, such as non-market economy status and cumulation, we have found two important and unique contributing factors in China, the FDI inflow and the low concentration ratio in Chinese industries.
The FDI hypothesis is related with studies on tariff jumping, yet it is different that it involves not investing in the AD initiating economy, which might not have comparative advantage. Some of the FDI inflow to China might be from foreign firms that were subjected to anti-dumping, either in its home economy or a third economy that it had foreign investment, to relocate to China, which has not been subjected to AD filings yet and which has comparative advantages in these industries. We are not able to directly test this hypothesis, however, our result is consistent with it. It requires multi-economy study to further explore the validity of this hypothesis.
Our review of AD filings against China has confirmed that the AD practice can be very convenient and effective tool to deter trade and that it has a number of dynamic impacts that are hard to quantify. China is likely to follow other new users of AD if the filings against Chinese products continue to rise and obstruct the creation of employment in export sector to absorb unemployment from the dismantled industries as a result of WTO transition and other reforms. Should this happen, significant welfare cost will occur to both China and its trade partners.
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